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CONCLUSION
The eight year history of the federal gambling tax had a shaky start but
was bolstered firmly by Kabriger, upholding its constitutionality. Then
a few states passed statutes providing that the mere possession of such a
stamp was prima facie evidence of gambling sufficient for a conviction.
After Florida's prima facie statute was declared unconstitutional by the
Florida Supreme Court the cases thereafter, both in Florida and in other
states, used the wagering tax stamp to support other evidence of gambling.
However, at least one city ordinance has been upheld where mere posses-
sion of the tax stamp was a violation.28 Even though the tax stamp and
prosecutions relating to its possession still extract venomous dissenting
opinions on constitutional grounds, it is firmly entrenched in our tax law.
Certainly, drastic changes are not imminent from court interpretation, so
any change will have to come from Congress.
Right or wrong, both the Congress and the courts have applied a
Machiavellian principle to suppress gambling under the guise of a revenue
measure. This method recalls the thoughts of Alexander Hamilton in
Federalist #12 where, after pointing out the revenues which could be de-
rived from a national tax on liquor, he added:
That article would well bear this rate of duty; and if it should tend to
diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally favorable to
the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals and to the health of society.
28 Deitch v. Chattanooga, 195 Tenn. 245, 258 S.W.2d 776 (1953).
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN ILLINOIS: ITS GROWTH
AND PROBABLE DEVELOPMENT
Since the recognition of the right of privacy' is very recent in Illinois,
only a handful of cases have been decided bearing on the subject. With the
exception of one class of cases (involving the right of privacy in regard to
the return and distribution of fingerprints and photographs of arrested
persons), the Illinois decisions involve the invasions of privacy by printed
items, rather than movies, 2 radio and television programs 3 and harassment
by debt collectors.4 Due to the lack of sufficient coverage of the subject by
1 The right of privacy is the right of the individual to be let alone or to lead a
secluded life, or to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public about matters with which the public is not necessarily con-
cerned. Schmuckler v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 116 N.E.2d 819 (Court Common Pleas Ohio
1953.)
2 Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285,297 Pac. 91 (1931).
a Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal. App.2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956).
4 Housh v. Peth, 99 Ohio App. 26, 135 N.E.2d 440 (1955). There the defendant in
attempting to collect a debt telephoned the plaintiff every day at home, for three
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the few Illinois cases on point, reference will be made to holdings in other
states for a necessary understanding of the subject.
INVASION OF PRIVACY BY UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A PERSON'S NAME
OR LIKENESS FOR ADVERTISING PURPOSES
The well known case of Eick v. Perk Dog Food5 was the first Illinois
decision involving the right of privacy. The defendants in that case, used
the photograph of a blind girl on the label of their product, depicting her
as the prospective donee of a seeing eye dog. Briefly, the court held that:
A person may not make an unauthorized appropriation of the personality
of another, especially of his name or likeness, without being liable to him for
mental distress as well as the actual pecuniary damages which the appropriation
causes.6
As early as 1905, it was established that the publication of a person's
photograph, without his consent, in connection with advertising, for the
mere purpose of increasing the profits and gains of the advertiser, consti-
tuted an invasion of privacy.7
The right to privacy in regard to advertisements may be waived by the
conduct of an individual. This is illustrated by the case of Jobnson v.
Boeing.8 There the plaintiff, employed by the defendant company, was
asked if he would pose for several photographs. The pictures were then
used for advertising purposes. On cross-examination the plaintiff testified
that he did not know the purpose for which the pictures were taken, but
thought that they might be published in the plant newspaper. The court
held that this admission by the plaintiff was proof enough that while
posing for the pictures he was fully aware that they would be published
somewhere. By making no objection to its publication nor prescribing
any restrictions upon its use, he was deemed to have waived his right to
privacy.
Though, (as will be shown below), the right of privacy is often waived
by a person who has become "a public character" or one in whom the
public has a rightful interest, "Such a public figure does not forfeit all
right of privacy, and he may still recover for unauthorized commercial
weeks (sometimes late at night) and telephoned her place of business. The defendant
also notified plaintiff's employers of her debt. As a result of the calls at home and place
of employment she lost a boarder and was threatened with dismissal by her employers.
It was held that the defendant's action constituted an invasion of privacy.
5 347 IIl. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
6 Ibid., at 299, 745.
7 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Fairfield v.
American Equipment, 138 Cal. App.2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955).
8 175 Kan. 275, 262 P.2d 808 (1953).
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uses of his name or photograph... ."0 Thus, when a corporation distrib-
uted advertising showing that a Mr. X., a famous breeder of thorough-
bred stock, used defendant's pills, when in fact he did not, the court held
that there was an invasion of privacy.' 0 In Continental Optical Co. v.
Reed," the plaintiff was a member of the U.S. Army working as a lens
grinder. The Army photographed him and used the picture without his
consent in several newspapers, as part of a plan for bolstering home front
morale, amounting to a use of the picture for advertising purposes. It was
contended by the defendant that the plaintiff, in joining the Army, be-
came a public personage and was not entitled to the right of privacy re-
specting his activities while in service. The court maintained the cause of
furthering the Army's war effort justified the plaintiff's loss of the right
of privacy in connection with all legitimate use of his person; but this
situation could not be extended into a license to private business to use
the picture for advertising.
INVASION OF PRIVACY BY UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A PERSON'S NAME
OR LIKENESS IN NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES FOR PURPOSES
OTHER THAN ADVERTISING
Certain requirements are fairly definite in determining whether the right
to privacy, in regard to printed matter, has been violated. One such re-
quirement is that the picture must be of and concerning the plaintiff. In
other words, to violate the right of privacy there must be a likeness of the
individual shown.12 On this simple rule, a federal district court in Illinois
decided the case of Branson v. Fawcett Publications.'3 The plaintiff, a cab
driver, was a racing driver in the summer months. The defendant pub-
lished True Confessions magazine. The picture which appeared in de-
fendant's magazine, was used to illustrate a fictional story. It made no
reference to the plaintiff, but the story concerned itself with an individ-
ual who was also a racing driver. The picture was a reproducion of a
high speed photograph of a racing accident in which the plaintiff was in-
jured. The plaintiff, because of the position of the car, could not be seen
in the picture. No likeness, face, image, or silhouette of the plaintiff was
shown. The court held, that the right of privacy does not extend to the
reproduction of an auto.
The right of privacy is also a personal one, the action not being main-
9 Prosser, Torts S 97 (1955).
10 Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909).
11 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949).
12 Branson v. Fawcett Publiactions, 124 F.Supp. 429 (N.D.I1I., 1954); Rozhon v.
Triangle Publications Inc., 230 F.2d 359 (C.A. 7th, 1956).
13 124 F.Supp. 429 (N.D.IU., 1954).
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tainable by a relative of the person concerned, (unless of course that rela-
tive is himself brought into unjustifiable publicity),' 14 nor does the cause
of action survive the individual. 15
It has been somewhat difficult to recover damages for the invasion of
privacy. As the district court of California said:
An invasion of the right of privacy occurs, not with the mere publication
of a photograph, but occurs when a photograph is published where the publisher
should know that its publication would offend the sensibilities of a normal
person. Where the photograph portrays nothing to shock the ordinary sense
of decency or propriety, where there is nothing uncomplimentary or discredit-
able in the photograph itself ... no actionable invasion of privacy occurs.16
Thus, where the Saturday Evening Post showed a picture of the plain-
tiff talking to a person threatening to jump off a bridge, the court held
that there was no invasion of privacy since the publisher of the picture
could not have had reason to believe that the picture would offend the
sensibilities of a normal person.17
Even though it would offend people of ordinary sensitivity the right
of privacy does not exist,
[I]f there has been consent to the publication or where the plaintiff has
become a public character, and thereby waived his right of privacy, nor in
the ordinary dissemination of news and events, nor in connection with the
life of a person in whom the public has a rightful interest, nor where the
information would be of public benefit.' 8
Thus, it being very arbitrary as to what would and what would not affect
the sensibilities of a normal person, the court, in the case involving "the
man on the bridge" could have more easily determined the case by hold-
ing that such an occurrence was newsworthy, thereby waiving the right
of privacy.
The situations which have been held newsworthy are numerous. Sev-
eral may be illustrated. A paper's announcement of the fact that a twelve
14 Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 325 P.2d 659 (Ct. of App. 2d Dist. Cal., 1958).
15 Ibid.
16 Samuel v. Curtis Pub. Co., 122 F.Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal., 1954); See Leverton v.
Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (C.A. 3d, 1951); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119
Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949).
17 Samuel v. Curtis Pub. Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal., 1954). In Gill v. Hearst, 40
Cal.2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953), a picture was published in a magazine without per-
mission of those photographed. This picture showed the plaintiffs sitting romantically
close to one another, the man with his arm around the other. The court held that there
was nothing so uncomplimentary or discreditable in the picture itself so that its publi-
cation might be objectionable as going beyond the limits of decency or indicating that
the defendants should have realized that it would be offensive to persons of ordinary
sensibilities.
18 Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133, 138 (1945).
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year old gave birth to a child was held to be a matter of public interest,
and not an invasion of privacy.19 In Berg v. Minneapolis Star and Trib-
une,20 the plaintiff, by litigation with his wife over divorce proceedings
to retain the custody of his children, was held to have made himself a
legitimate item of news.
The question may be asked as to whether an event that was news-
worthy at one time, loses this distinction by the passage of time. The
answer is that usually it does not. The leading case of Sidis v. F-R Publish-
ing Corp.2 1 illustrates this point. There, New Yorker Magazine, in 1937,
printed an article telling the whereabouts and activities of the plaintiff,
who, in 1910, claimed world reknown as a child prodigy. At the time of
the printing he was in seclusion, and had been for many years. The court
held that the plaintiff's subsequent history, containing, as it did, answers
to the question of whether or not the plaintiff had fulfilled his early
promise, was still a matter of public concern. In another situation the de-
fendant radio station broadcast a program concerning an elderly member
of the community.22 It told about the old man's disappearance from the
community years ago, how he was believed to have been shot, how he
finally showed up after everyone thought he was dead, and the fact that
he left all his money to one of his two daughters. Both daughters' names
were mentioned, and they brought suit for invasion of privacy. Because
the story was part of the history of the community, the court held that
the passage of time could not give privacy to the acts of the father.
RESTRICTIONS ON THE PUBLICATION OF NEWSWORTHY EVENTS
It is possible even though an occurrence concerning a plaintiff was
newsworthy, the defendant may still be guilty of invasion of the right of
privacy. Thus, if a newsworthy event takes place and the picture of the
event is used by the defendant in connection with a story that deals with
something other than this particular event, an invasion of privacy may
occur. In Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co.,23 the defendant published, two
years later, a picture taken of the plaintiff as she lay in the street after
being hit by a car. It was published as an illustration for an article on
19 Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1945).
2079 F.Supp. 597 (D.C. Minn., 1948). Cf. Jenkins v. Dell Pub. Co., 251 F.2d 447
(C.A. 3d, 1958); Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D. D.C., 1946) where the court
held that the plaintiff's misfortune in being a defendant in a criminal trial made him
the object of legitimate public interest.
21 113 F.2d 806 (CA. 2d, 1940). See Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (C.A.
3d, 1951); Estill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 186 F.2d 1017 (C.A. 7th, 1951) where after 15 years
the event was still considered newsworthy.
22 Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948).
23 192 F.2d 974 (CA. 3d, 1951). Accord: Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal.2d 273, 239
P.2d 630 (1952).
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traffic accidents with emphasis on pedestrian carelessness-entitled, "They
Asked to be Killed." Evidence established that the child, at the time of the
accident, was not careless. The court granted the fact that the accident
was newsworthy, but that this use of the picture had nothing at all to do
with her accident; that the plaintiff, the legitimate subject of publicity for
one accident, now "becomes a pictorial, frightful example of pedestrian
carelessness." Thus, it was concluded, this picture exceeded the bounds of
the privilege.
Another restriction is that when a news account comes to be the basis
for public entertainment, it will be considered that the bounds of the
privilege were exceeded. In Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Inc.,24 the plaintiff
had suffered injuries by reason of being beaten and robbed. The defend-
ant on a program called, "Calling All Cars" in dramatizing the holdup and
shooting, used the plaintiff's name without his consent. It was held to be
an invasion of privacy.
Exploitation of a newsworthy event, or public figure to facilitate the
circulation of a magazine or newspaper, will be an invasion of privacy.
That one is exploiting and facilitating circulation rather than using the
story as a genuine article of information is shown by fictionalization. By
way of illustration is the recent case of Annerino v. Dell.2 5 In 1954, Mr. X
was being held in the Criminal Court Building in Chicago. His girl friend
gave him a gun which was later used in his escape. When apprehended,
he shot a detective. The detective was taken to a hospital, where he was
met by his wife, the plaintiff. The plaintiff was then told that her husband
had died. While in a condition of shock and grief, pictures were taken of
her. Three months later the defendant, in one of its magazines, Inside
Detective, retold the story in an article entitled, If You Love Me, Slip Me
a Gun, which included a photograph of the plaintiff. The story included
a subtitle which read, "She lifted her ballerina skirt. 'There honey, fastened
to the garter. . .' "The court held that this subtitle, along with other facts
showed that the real story had been fictionalized. Quoting from Hazlitt v.
Fawcett,26 the court said:
If so' much of the story as is relied on was fictionalized and dramatized,
I may not rule as a matter of law, that it was legitimate public interest because
informational and on that account not actionable.... For, to the extent that
the defendants indulged in fictionalization, the inference gathers strength that
the dominant characteristic of the story was not genuine information but fic-
tional readability conducive to increased circulation for the magazine. Thus
2428 F.Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal., 1939).
25 17 111. App. 2d 205,49 N.E.2d 761 (1958).
26 116 F.Supp. 538, 545 (D.C. Conn., 1953). In this case there was no photograph
involved. The plaintiff was convicted of killing a man. The defendant published a
story relating to the murder in a fictionalized version; held for the plaintf
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the court may be deemed to state an actionable claim on the theory that the
published story was in essence not a vehicle of information but rather a device
to facilitate commercial exploitation.27
THE PROBLEM OF FINGERPRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF AN ARRESTED MAN
IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The situation sometimes arises where a man, either acquitted or par-
doned of a crime, demands a release of any files of identification taken of
him by police.
In Kolb v. O'Connor,28 the plaintiffs, arrested for various crimes, were
tried and acquitted. Fingerprints, photographs, and other records of iden-
tification were taken from them by the Chief of Police of the City of
Chicago. These records were kept in the files of the criminal department
of the Chicago Police Department. The records were on view to members
of the general public, who had been victims of various crimes. The plain-
tiffs demanded return of the files, on the ground that showing them to
other victims would be an invasion of his privacy. The court, holding
that the files did not have to be returned, said: "The right of the individual
must be subordinate to the public.129 Continuing, the court maintained
that without a legislative mandate, the police may retain such files for the
purpose of such limited exhibition as is here involved. The court stressed
the individual's subordination to the state, and the fact that the police were
using the pictures and prints for such a limited purpose. But where the
photographs are used in a type of rogues' gallery, a different result is
reached.
An action was brought in Indiana,30 after plaintiff's acquittal in a crim-
inal case, to compel defendants to surrender fingerprints and photographs
made when the plaintiff was arrested. His picture was put in a rogues'
gallery. As to the fingerprints, it was held that since they were filed in a
cabinet, and only accessible to those who were trained to read them, there
was not an invasion of the right of privacy. But as to the exhibition of
the pictures, since a visitor brought there for the purpose of identifying
someone, might conclude that all the pictures were of criminals, there was
a violation of the right of privacy. The court added, by way of dictum,
that if the photographs were filed away from the public view (as was
27 Annerino v. Dell, 17 Ill. App. 2d 205, 209, 149 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1958).
28 14 Ill. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957). See Maxwell v. O'Connor, 1 Ill. App. 2d
124, 117 N.E.2d 326, which held that the criminal court of Cook County has no juris-
diction in an action to recover these records, on the ground that it is more in the nature
of a right of privacy, and, therefore, involves a civil right. The Kolb case is noted in 7
De Paul L. Rev. 120 (1957).
29 14 Ill. App. 2d 81, 91, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957).
30 Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364,66 N.E.2d 755 (1946).
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done in the Illinois case) they would be in the same category as the filed
fingerprints. 31
The problem of whether a man's picture can be displayed in a rogues'
gallery, or his photograph and fingerprints disseminated to law enforce-
ment agencies over the world, before conviction or after acquittal has
come up quite often.
Two early Louisiana cases,3 2 not discussing the right of privacy, did not
allow the placing of plaintiff's portrait in a rogues' gallery prior to his
conviction; a Missouri court refused to allow dissemination of photographs
and fingerprints to all parts of the country before conviction.33 In Mc-
Govern v. Van Riper,3 4 the validity of a New Jersey statute providing
for distribution of fingerprints and photographs to law enforcement agen-
cies immediately upon arrest was in issue. The court held the statute to
be within the proper exercise of the state's police power for the purpose
of facilitating crime detection and punishment. One who has been indicted
has to "submit to such slight invasion of his claimed right of privacy as
may accompany the performance of the police duty required by the stat-
ute."35 It was also said that by reason of being indicted, the plaintiff's life
ceased to be private; that since his life now became a matter of public
interest,
[S]uch steps as the legislature designates shall be taken by public officials in
the interest of the public for the purpose of the due administration of the
criminal laws of the state, can't be said to be an unwarranted infringement of
complainant's right of privacy.3 6
Another court held it no invasion of privacy where plaintiff could not
secure return of pictures after his release from a reformatory, the picture
having been distributed to various parts of the country. The court felt
that such distribution was justifiable to protect societyA'
Another problem is shown in Hansson v. Harris.38 There, the plaintiff
was arrested for a misdemeanor and was photographed; an informal hear-
ing was held where defendant's attorney (plaintiff here) promised to keep
his client out of trouble. Now the plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendant from
31 In Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J. Eq. 9, 39 A.2d 851 (1944), where the action was
not brought on the grounds of invasion of privacy, plaintiff was arrested, but no indict-
ment was found. His pictures were sent to and remain in a rogues' gallery. The court
held that in the absence of statute it is in the discretion of the police as to whether or
not to give them up.
82 Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906); Schulman v. Whitaker, 117
La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906).
33 348 Mo. 426, 153 S.W.2d 834 (1941). 35 Ibid., at 343,472.
34 140 N.J. Eq. 341, 54 A.2d 469 (1947). 36 Ibid., at 343, 472.
37 Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 150 Pac. 1122 (1915).
38252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App., 1952).
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disseminating the photographs. The court refused the injunction, stating
that the taking of the pictures must be considered the same as other ad-
ministrative procedure of the police to which a person, at times, must be
subjected for the common good.
CONCLUSION
Though many of the factual situations dealt with have not come up in
Illinois, it is probable that the courts here will follow the reasoning in
sister state cases.
In the matters of advertising and magazine-newspaper articles, not too
much difficulty arises. It is often obvious just what does constitute a
newsworthy event which will deprive people of their right to privacy.
In regard to the problem of fingerprints and photographs of arrested
men and the right to distribute such materials, the problem is slightly
more complex. The present position in Illinois is that upon acquittal the
file need not be surrendered, if the file was used for limited purposes and
not in a rogues' gallery. But as to what must be done after a pardon, or
before a conviction, in regard to placing a picture in a rogues' gallery or
disseminating the information, the Illinois courts are silent.
THE RIGHT OF COMMUNISTS TO TRAVEL ABROAD
AND THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEM
OF DUE PROCESS
A Bill has been introduced in Congress which would give the Secretary
of State the power to deny passports to persons knowingly engaged in
activities intended to further the international Communist movement.1
This proposed legislation comes as a result of two decisions, Kent and
Briehl v. Dulles,2 and Dayton v. Dulles,3 by the Supreme Court on June
16, 1958, declaring that the Secretary of State has no such power in the
absence of express Congressional provision.
POLICY TOWARDS COMMUNISTS FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE KENT AND
DAYTON CASES
The policy of refusing passports to leading American Communists was
first adopted after World War I. The policy was ignored between 1931
1 H.R.55, introduced by Rep. Selden January 7, 1959. For an excellent historical and
critical approach to American passport policies, together with recommendations for
revised legislation, consult Freedom to Travel, New York Bar Association, Dodd,
Mead & Company, New York, 1958.
2 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
3 357 U.S. 144 (1958). There is a sharp distinction between these two cases. Dayton
was accused of being a Communist. Kent and Briehl were refused passports due to
their refusal to file an affidavit stating whether or not they were or ever had been
Communists.
